Introduction

This is “What Just Happened?,” the podcast that looks at the biggest brand crises of our time, what they meant for organisational strategy and behaviour, and their lasting impact on our approach to crisis communication.

I’m Kate Hartley. And I’m Tamara Littleton. And together, we’ll delve into what happened, why it mattered, and whether it could happen again.

Episode 

Tamara Littleton: We’re tackling one of the biggest crises in our lifetime that still has repercussions today. Kate, can you share what crisis we’re talking about in this episode?

Kate Hartley: Yes. Today, we’re looking at one of the biggest environmental disasters we’ve ever seen and certainly the biggest marine oil spill. We’re going to examine the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster of 2010, its impact on BP’s reputation, and, importantly, its leadership.

TL: So, what happened?

KH: Well, on the night of April 20, 2010, there was a huge explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico, about 41 miles off the coast of Louisiana. The rig was owned and operated by an offshore drilling company called Transocean and leased by BP. Without delving into too much technical detail, the rig stood in 5000 feet of water and was drilling into what was then the deepest well ever drilled, about 13,000 feet below the sea. To give you some context, the first rig set up in that area was in the 1930s, made of wood, and sat in 14 feet of water. This was really serious deepwater drilling.

Without getting into massive technical detail, natural gas shot up the rig, buckling the drill pipe. There was supposed to be an emergency valve, called a blowout protector, to cap the well in case of an accident. That failed, causing an explosion that killed 11 people on the rig and injured another 17. It was a huge tragedy and a terrible accident, and the safety mechanisms in place simply hadn’t worked.

The rig was on fire, and you can’t imagine how terrifying this must have been for the people on it. The rig eventually capsized and sank to the bottom of the sea on April 22, and at that point, oil started spilling into the Gulf. Initially, underwater cameras showed that the well was leaking 1000 barrels of crude oil every day into the ocean. There were many attempts to stop that leak, but they largely failed.

By April 28, the Coast Guard said 5000 barrels a day were pouring into the sea. A state of emergency was declared nine days after the explosion in Louisiana, and on April 30, BP’s then-CEO Tony Hayward said BP would take full responsibility for the spill and would pay all legitimate claims and for the cleanup operation. After the spill, BP tried various technical solutions to halt the spill, but they only succeeded on July 10, two and a half months after the initial explosion. More than 200 million gallons of oil were dumped into the sea, continuing to sink to the bottom of the ocean for more than a year, and the effects were felt 1300 miles away. It was more than eight years before all the residues started to return to normal levels.

TL: I feel the word spill, an industry term, doesn’t really feel right in this context. It really doesn’t.

KH: It’s a problematic word. It sounds quite gentle, like, “I’m sorry, I spilled my drink.” It doesn’t convey the seriousness of the situation. But as you say, it’s an industry term. The ecological impact could take decades to recover and still hasn’t recovered now, all these years later. Over 100,000 seabirds died, 160,000 young sea turtles, untold numbers of fish, and corals were destroyed. The list goes on; it was absolutely devastating.

TL: A devastating impact on the environment. Let’s look at BP itself, though. What was the financial implication of this?

KH: BP was quite close to financial collapse as a result of this disaster. They agreed to pay $20 billion in compensation for economic damage in the region. A year later, they had to pay the largest environmental damage settlement in US history, $20.8 billion. Reuters reported that in total, it cost BP $65 billion over the next eight years, including compensation, fines, cleanup costs, and so on. The impact was huge.

TL: And the impact on the community, which, of course, is the most important thing?

KH: The impact on the community was horrific. People living along the coastline rely on it for their livelihood. The fishing industry was decimated, and tourism came to a complete standstill. Thousands of people were left temporarily unemployed.

TL: I’m desperately trying to find the positive here. Did anything change for the industry as a result of this?

KH: I’d love to say yes, immediately. There was a quote from National Geographic in 2020, the 10-year anniversary of the spill, by Matt Lee Ashley, a researcher at the Center for American Progress. He said that before Deepwater, there was a mentality that the oil and gas industry, as it was going further offshore, was capable of self-regulating. Deepwater completely burst that assumption.

As these big explorations went further from land, they became more self-regulating. There were some changes to the industry straight away, and in 2016, increased regulations were brought in. However, many of those were rolled back by Trump, and inspections and safety checks declined between 2017 and 2019. People are still drilling from ultra-deep wells, so there’s a real possibility this could happen again. Long-term changes? Possibly not.

TL: So, bringing it back to our industry, what does this mean for crisis preparation? Can you predict something like this happening?

KH: Terry Garcia, a former deputy administrator at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, said something interesting. He mentioned that we have a tendency to fight the last war and prepare for the last incident, rather than looking at what the next thing might be. In 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil spill led to a lot of regulations for tanker spills, but nothing for oil rigs. The next issue will likely look very different from the last one. Things like the impact of climate change on rigs, hurricanes, or mudslides will change the dynamics. We must look to the future, not just the past, to predict the next crisis.

TL: That’s definitely a lesson to take away. Can we look at Tony Hayward’s leadership? You said he was the then-CEO. What about the role he played in the crisis? He was the main spokesperson in front of the media.

KH: He was, and this is the big takeaway for our industry for crisis communications. He’s most famous for saying in a TV interview that he wanted his life back. Let’s look at the context of that. He’s a technician, a geologist, and he started his career at BP as a rig geologist straight from university. He understood the implications of what happened. However, he’s not necessarily a professional communicator. He later said he would have done better with an acting degree rather than a geology one, his words, not mine, in a BBC documentary in November 2010.

He went to the region quickly, but there was already a lot of hostility towards him and BP, understandable given what happened. Obama, who was then the US President, had gone on record saying, “Make no mistake, we will fight this spill with everything we’ve got. For as long as it takes, we will make BP pay for the damage its company has caused.” BP was cast as the villain, understandably. Hayward apologised for the disaster, but he said, “We’re sorry for the massive disruption this has caused to their lives. There’s no one who wants this thing over more than I do. I’d like my life back.”

TL: Let’s take a moment. I remember that quote, and Kate, you and I have discussed this many times because it’s a critical statement. It lacks empathy for what everyone was going through given the level of environmental disaster. The natural reaction to that statement is, “It’s not about you.”

KH: It’s really bad. That was the tipping point where public sentiment turned against him. He later said he was appalled when he read that back and realised what a blunder it was. But it wasn’t the only time he made mistakes. He was filmed shortly after arriving in the area, saying, “It’s clearly been a tragic accident, and I feel great grief and sorry.” I’m sure he did feel that, but it made it all about him again. It wasn’t great.

TL: What were the other blunders?

KH: There were many. He said the spill was tiny compared to the whole Gulf region. That might be technically correct, but it’s not the point. This was a massive spill compared to other environmental disasters. People died, lost their jobs and livelihoods. The environmental impact was horrific.

He was also filmed sailing on what the media called the clear blue waters of the Solent with his son on Father’s Day, contrasting with the cleanup operation. There were side-by-side pictures of him sailing on this lovely, clear sea, and people pulling oil-slick birds out of the destruction. That was a real misstep. He hadn’t seen his son for three months, and he was really angry about the media response. He said it was the only way he could see his son because his son was in a boat race. But context matters, and it wasn’t a good look.

TL: Yeah, it’s the optics. I remember that being splashed all over the papers. In crisis preparation, leaders and communicators need to think several steps ahead about how it will look in the media. What’s that headline going to be?

KH: Absolutely. It just went on and on. He appeared before Congress in the US in June, a couple of months after the explosion. He didn’t come across well. He looked tired and stilted, very robotic. At one point, he was asked a question about whether he kept a commitment to making safety integral to BP’s success. He didn’t answer the question, saying he was distraught. Harry Waxman, who was questioning him, said, “Will you answer the question yes or no? I don’t want to know whether you’re distraught.” That’s the point, isn’t it?

TL: You mentioned him looking tired. He would have been fronting this for several months by then. There’s a lesson about the importance of bringing in others to share the load. Having everything on your shoulders, I’m not surprised he was exhausted. That’s a long crisis, but it’s something we talk to our clients about. You have to share the load because one person on their own is going to lose their good judgement.

KH: Exactly. A lot of media reports at the time talked about how exhausted Hayward was looking. That’s a sign to take a step back. Mistakes happen when you’re exhausted. We see this in simulations when people have been going through something for a few hours. Imagine what it’s like when someone’s been doing it for months.

He should have had people around him saying it’s time to take a break, ideally not on a sailing trip with your son. Step back, let someone else take over. Don’t do everything yourself. You’re not coming across well, and that’s when mistakes happen. In that same Congress hearing, he was grilled on BP’s 15 workers who had been killed in a refinery explosion in Texas in 2005. In that disaster, BP was found to be willfully negligent, leading to a record fine.

The following year, in 2006, a pipeline in Alaska ruptured, spilling 200,000 gallons of crude oil. BP had been criticised for its safety record. Hayward took over in 2007, after those two events, to improve safety and culture. He said he implemented a systematic improvement in safety and culture, but it failed in Deepwater’s case. Saying safety is your first priority won’t land well if that’s failed.

About five days before the explosion, Hayward spoke at BP’s AGM about the balance between cost-cutting and safety and the need for organisational efficiency. That came back to haunt him. You have a human disaster where people lost their lives, and then a robotic-sounding Hayward who appears to care more about operational efficiency than safety. That’s how he came across. Insiders also started talking about company culture, and BP didn’t come out well. 60 Minutes, the CBS TV show, did an in-depth interview with a survivor who said there was always pressure on workers to get the oil due to delays.

There was pressure to pick up the pace, and he talked about the failures of safety procedures. Another former BP insider came forward to talk about process failures, and there was pressure to cut costs across the organisation. Hayward found himself repeatedly saying that cost-cutting had nothing to do with the disaster, but when you hear cost-cutting and disaster, you put those two things together. Context is really important.

Hayward eventually handed control of the spill response to Bob Dudley, who succeeded him as BP CEO. CNN described Dudley as an American-born veteran of BP. They reported that Hayward was visiting shareholders across Europe and the Middle East to shore up support and sell assets to pay for the cleanup. The implication was that Dudley was in situ, and Hayward was out talking to shareholders. That’s a lesson: you don’t always need the CEO fronting a crisis if they’re not going to come across well.

TL: The phrase American-born veteran of BP sounds very deliberate in describing the new CEO. What do you think about that choice of words? I’m presuming that wording was given to CNN.

KH: I love that you picked up on that. Hayward’s nationality added to his perception as the villain. In US films and TV shows, the bad guy often has a British accent. There were many media reports saying “BP, formerly known as British Petroleum.” A magazine article talked about “these pesky Europeans.” Lots of people referenced his nationality negatively. By contrast, they emphasised Dudley being American-born. Ultimately, this cost Hayward his job. At the end of July, three and a half months after the explosion, he agreed to leave BP, and Dudley took over.

TL: We’re going to have a guest on soon to share their views. Kate, can you summarise the lessons that can be learned from this?

KH: There are three big lessons. First, your CEO is not necessarily the right person to front the crisis, especially if they come across badly or lack empathy. It’s crucial to get the right person out there. Hayward, sadly, was not that person.

Second, spot the warning signs earlier. Hayward was not landing well in the US, and he could have been removed from that situation much sooner, avoiding many blunders. Third, look at the context in which your disaster has happened. Never talk about operational efficiencies and safety in the same breath, especially given BP’s previous safety records. Safety has to come first and foremost, and you must communicate that clearly.

Break

TL: Our guest today is Zaiba Malik, the founder of Coppergate Communications. She’s a media and presentation coach, a crisis and strategic communications consultant, and a former news and current affairs journalist with BBC News, Panorama, Radio 4, and Dispatches. Welcome, Zaiba.

Zaiba Malik: Hello. Thank you very much for having me.

TL: Zaiba, you have extensive experience investigating crises, interviewing, and training people to be in front of the camera in a crisis. One of the suggestions with this crisis is that Tony Hayward was the wrong person to be fronting it. Perhaps they needed someone with more empathy who connected better with people. In your experience, what are the critical qualities for a leader who’s up against a select committee, a Senate hearing, or in front of the media?

ZM: Looking back at Tony Hayward’s appearances in front of the media and his communication choices, it’s fair to say he didn’t handle it well. I wonder if anyone within the organisation was giving him robust advice. When I work with clients, especially at senior levels, I emphasise using peacetime effectively—by peacetime, I mean non-crisis time.

Not every CEO has natural empathy or is a natural communicator. Communication skills for CEOs are taken more seriously now than in Hayward’s time. He left BP in 2010, so we’re talking 14 years on. The level of internal advice might not have been as strong then. We all know the risks to reputation, individuals, and organisations since the BP scandal.
I advise CEOs to use non-crisis times for rehearsals and training to see if they have natural empathy. Not every CEO is a natural communicator, and you can’t always tell until they’re in front of you. Use peacetime to see how someone elevates a script to something human and humane while staying legally sound. It’s difficult to get right, but that’s what CEOs are paid for. If they’re not a natural fit, I advise having others in training to see who is a more natural communicator.
Journalists don’t like comms people being the crisis spokesperson, but there are often senior personnel who can take on that role. CEOs tend to freeze under pressure, so someone a step down might communicate more effectively.

TL: When dealing with something as serious as the loss of life, what do we expect leaders to say or show when talking on camera?

ZM: Leaders should think of key bullet points, ensuring they get things in the correct order. Concern for loss of life or staff should be the dominant thing. Demonstrate the action taken as well. Legals are heavily involved during crises, but that doesn’t mean you can’t communicate humanely. Saying sorry is crucial now, though it wasn’t previously. Apologies should be genuine and connected to the issue. People are cynical about insincere apologies. Understand what you’re apologising for, and inhabit the apology.
Timing is also key. Schedule interviews at appropriate times, not first thing in the morning or last thing at night. Prep in advance, even if it’s just half an hour. Ensure you have key messages, the right tone, and are ready for challenging questions. Crises never come at an ideal time, but it’s crucial to pause, think, and prepare.

KH: You mentioned spotting signs of burnout in leaders. What should leaders do when they notice these signs in themselves?

ZM: Delegation is crucial. Preparedness in a crisis involves understanding who is responsible for what and who will take decisions. Have a risk committee including HR, comms, legal, and operations to help the CEO in decision-making. This prevents sole decision-making and promotes collaborative thinking. In crises involving fatalities, the emotional impact on staff and the CEO is significant. Preparedness must include strong delegation and decision-making foundations.

Outro

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